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"Need for mathematical basis should dominate one's search for any new theory. Philosophical or physical ideas must be adjusted to fit mathematics. Not other way around. One ought to start with mathematical basis. One can tinker with philosophical or physical ideas to adapt them to mathematics, but mathematics cannot by tinkered with. It is subject to rigid rules and is restricted by logic. Distrust philosophical or physical concepts as basis for theory. One should concentrate on getting interesting mathematics and put one's trust in it, even if it does not appear at first sight to be connected with physics. Equations of any theory are worked out before their physical meaning is obtained. Physical meaning follows behind mathematics. Physical interpretation is obtained only after mathematical basis is obtained" (Dirac 1978; abridged) 
 , establishing ranking order. Differences in valuation are differences in attention or perception, and pleasure is "organizing" change or "growth" in state of brain neural network M at synapses due to excitations arising from stimuli (Hebb 1949) .
For instance, growth in linkages within frontal areas of thalamus and connected areas of cerebral cortex would change intentional responses to search and consume problems, such as search for economic solutions, and simultaneously give pleasure (Pribram 1960) . Different stimuli    have different values V mapped by onto them by different people Ч , and so, different people exhibit different responses to identical stimuli or identical responses to different stimuli. Their behavior changes over time, because changes over time due excitation-initiated growth at synapses. "Preferences" are merely different stimuli; they are not "rational" at all; they cannot be chosen; neither helping other people at cost to self nor satisfying self exclusively is more or less "rational"; pleasure is change of state of brain by excitation-initiated growth of synapses caused by different sequences excitations, whose only physiological qualities are their distinguishability, novelty, and more or less organizing effect on already existing state of neural network, so that some order of stimuli is "preferred"; people cannot do something contrary to pleasure, as opposed to because of pleasure (Leibniz 1700; Hebb 1949) . has no influence on their behavior. They do not know about it. Things, insofar as they determine behavior of Ч , are merely different deformations of single geometrical manifold, which extends only insofar as senses and thoughts of Ч extend, and which envelopes Ч or surrounds them from all directions, at any moment. If small perturbation away from starting point in our single geometrical manifold leads to any other point which is in identical equivalence class as starting point, i.e., all points in neighborhood of starting point are in single equivalence-class, then neighborhood of starting point was "stable," so that small change in stimulus leads to small change in response. If several or infinitely many equivalence-classes intersect in neighborhood of starting point, then small perturbation from starting point in one set lead to another point which is in different equivalence-class, which is called "bifurcation," so that small change in stimulus leads to great change in response.
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To anticipate or describe actions or behavior of set of people {... ,
, … }, we analyze sums of 's or co-chains of commutative functions defined on ' e if they are not empty, where ' e , , , …,
is set of coverings of , and where 
changes have corresponding variable-quantity labels in this way. Let
 l , and operator
values, in sense that we require it, is "influence structure" of , which is set of answers of kind to following set of questions: if l changes, what happens to ? (Rosen 1984 )
If several simultaneous changes in environment are investigated, then we seek set of
In fact, any question we are interested, however complicated, in may answered by selecting coefficients { ...
labeling environmental changes, and computing: , which is arbitrary part of "influence structure" of . And so, we need to know how to determine in most general way.
, is generated as right-hand limiting sum across real boundary, by equivalence-class of pairs of analytic functions, [
, which are different flows in complex domains above and below real boundary, respectively, where Kothe 1952; Sato 1958; Schapira 1972; Isao 1992 
generalized function or hyper-function, and = is set of every hyperfunction defined on (Kothe 1952; Sato 1958; Sato 1959 , and for behavior of many people), but this is treated in §3 of this paper, whereas §2 of this paper considers function for one person (Sato 1960; Kashiwara, Kawai, & Sato 1973) .
Equivalence-class nature of generalized functions, encompassing many pairs of components, allows us to require that hierarchical order of values is not changed by conformal re-scaling = of metric corresponding to conformal re-scaling 1. every dispersed set generated by mapping , including any set which is not any kind of function, say, because its lacks consistent segmented "motion" Cuhel 1907; Bernardelli 1934; 1936; 1938; 
is defined, so that phase-space with common degrees of freedom does not exist in most general cases, prohibiting inter-personal comparisons of values for lack of common phase-space, no extra-mathematical assumptions being necessary (Sato 1958; Kashiwara, Kawai, & Sato 1973; Kashiwara 1980; Isao 1992) . , Rosen 1962; 1963; 1983 
 
        , then ) , * ( , , M M F            ( , * ( E V E V     ) ) F  ( ( V V , ) ) E E  commutes (e.g.= 0 for indifference-curves Φ N } E 1, , , N , ) I   ( , Q ..., I N Q Q ) I I 1 {G N G  1, ( U Q ,..., I 1, ( ,..., , I N ) I Q Q  , if 1, (dQ /d I  , …, , N I dQ / ) d = ,…, , and > ,…, , then person Ч 1, ( , Φ  , ..., I N Q Q (0 0) ) I   (0 0

We cannot assume that order of consumption of perhaps infinitely many different quantities of different goods, within single bundle of goods, does not affect pleasure achieved from consuming such bundle of goods. In choice-rich environment, bundles of goods are supposed to be hierarchically ranked, and yet value of bundles is not defined unless order of consumption is defined, but order of consumption, is not fixed ahead of time, physiologically.
Order of consumption is simultaneously determined with bundles, and change in it determines Human central nervous system is activation-inhibition network of nerve-cells where excitations evoke changes at synapses according to processes at level of dendrites which are superposed over inhibitory background of changing magnitude (Rashevsky 1933; Hebb 1949; Hayek 1952; Pribram 1986; . Activity and excitation, of course, increases temperature of activation-inhibition network (Gerard & Serota 1938; Serota 1939) . Also, volume diffusion transmission of free molecules causes bulk activation or inhibition, or bulk change in rate of activation or inhibition, at lower energy cost, wherever memory-related precision of activation-inhibition networks, is not required, e.g., readiness for motion, sensation of hunger, and so on (Bach-y-Rita 1993; 2005) . Individual nerve-cells are spontaneously excited over time with regular frequency generated underlying wave-like processes in dendrites, or may be above and beyond excited or inhibited by environmental stimuli or connected nerve-cells (Rashevsky 1933; Gerard & Young 1937; Gerard & Libet 1939; 1941) .
There is significant delay between when stimulus is and begins to cause modification of neural network and response and when it consciously felt, sensation being evoked only as dendritic changes as synapses occur, and vice versa, motivation is always unconscious, whereas consciousness, if present, is only ability to interrupt motivation, given later final state of neural network; earlier stimuli may be masked or enhanced by later stimuli according to clock time, and due to unconscious processing, internal time has no 1-to-1 correspondence with clock or proper time whatsoever; most stimuli are not consciously felt at all, but elicit unconscious conditioned or orienting responses (Condillac 1754a; 1754b; Sokolov 1958; Deecke & Kornhuber 1965;  Leonid A. Shapiro
December 31, 2011 arxiv.org/abs/1112.2630 Libet 1966; 1973; Alberts et al 1967; Feinstein et al 1979; Brass, Haynes, Heinze, & Soon 2008) .
Central nervous system covers geometry of physical environment with distinguishable equivalence-classes * E Э  E . It may only code, experiments show, however, auditory, tactile, and visual excitations in response to stimuli distinguished by neuronal model M , as probability-distribution functions, which are fully described predicted by postulating a barrier beginning at certain height which fluctuates while being approached by random-walk motion as function of proper time  parameterized by a positive drift-coefficient; at that point, one nerve-cell emits signal to any other connected nerve-cell, so that individual time-intervals between excitations are stochastic, code no information, and instead, stimuli distinguishable by neuronal model are represented as distinguishable statistical information about time-intervals, namely, probability-distribution functions with different combinations of barrier and driftcoefficient which generate such time-intervals: "neuron is thus processor of stochastic dendritic events which displays its computed output as statistics of sequence of inter-spike intervals" (Berger et al 1990; Berger & Pribram 1992; King, Pribram, & Xie 1994 ).
"Attention" or selective perception of simultaneously present stimuli of different kinds, and "anticipation," or speculative responsiveness to expected stimuli has been know to exist, but anatomical apparatus involves in such processes occurred was not know (Condillac 1754a; 1754b) . Actually, in mammals: afferent nervous fibers in optic nerve transmit excitations from retina to visual cortex in the brain, but efferent fibers optic nerve transmit excitations from central nervous system to retina, changing excitation pattern response to environmental stimuli in the retina as function of neuronal model M ; for instance, visual stimuli which have already ceased to exist, but earlier were significant cause of excitations, evoke responses in the retina, and auditory and tactile stimuli, which modify neuronal model, then modify excitation patterns in the retina whose cause is visual stimuli (Brouwer 1933; Pribram, Spinelli, & Weingarten 1965; Spinelli & Weingarten 1966a; 1966b) . Such "centrifugal control" of excitation of nervecells is present in muscle-cells and many periphery nerve-cells or receptors are excited or inhibited by environment, which have both afferent fibers leading away from them to brain stem and central nervous system and efferent fibers leading to them from brain stem and central nervous system, permitting self-stimulation at periphery, eliminating possibility of any "pure" experience controlling learning, and allowing environmental noise to be filtered out by central So, then, "pleasure is not activity of particular structures in nervous system, nor is it particular kind of pattern of cerebral organization; pleasure is growth or development of cerebral organization" (Hebb 1949 ). "Satiety" or "emotion," which determines when behavior "stops" is mostly determined in forebrain, in amygdala; "motivation," which determines when behavior "begins," when to "go," or when to "continue going" is mostly determined in striatum of basal ganglia (Hebb 1949; Pribram 2003) . Cerebral cortex determines actions, because it determines memory (and thus, perception, pleasure, pain), but it neither initiates behavior, which is done in basal ganglia hippocampus and striatum, nor interrupts behavior and so that other actions may begin, which is done in amygdala, and then, hippocampus determines "attitudes" or classes of ordered pairs of motivation and emotion (Pribram 2006 any part of neuronal model already formed; "memory" does not change after lesions, but lesion significantly decrease rate of "learning," i.e., rate at which neuronal model M changes (Lashley 1929; Sokolov 1958; 1960a; 1960b; Pribram 1966) . When lesions occur, functions of destroyed parts of cerebral cortex, periphery nerves, and visual cortex, unless quantitative damage is very extensive, are moved to another part of brain and gradually return, e.g., "we see with brain, not with eyes" (Lashley 1929; 1948; Frank & Lashley 1934; Hayek 1952 Thus, "nearness" and "distance" quantitatively determine structure of central nervous system, structure of neuronal model, and products of metabolic and repair processes occurring in central nervous system, but pleasure or pain evoked by any stimulus are totally invariant to quantitative structure and changes in quantitative structure; gross destruction and change in quantitative structure experimentally produce no change in memory, so that pleasure or pain evoked by any environmental stimulus is determined only by change or growth of connections which determine relative position of elements in space, but not upon quantitative differences in relative position of elements in space (Lashley 1929; Hebb 1949; Hayek 1952) . Metric is required to indicate "nearness" and "distance" between equivalences-classes of distinguishable things in perceived environment (Rosen 1976; 1977) while satisfying above constraints. This results in hierarchical and ordinal nature of preferences concerning all different permutations of distinguishable stimuli (Cuhel 1907) . Cost, then, is "regret of forgone opportunity," namely, next greatest preference in immediate future which could have alternatively been satisfied by behavior, and must be forgone in immediate future if greatest preference, and present behavior is carried out instead of it (Condillac 1754a; 1754b).
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Supposedly, activation-inhibition networks sometimes generate "heterarchies" of values, 
 , e.g., mouse prefers food over sex, sex over avoidance of electric shock, and avoidance of electric shock over food (McCulluch 1945a; 1945b; 1956) . Actually, "coarse" measurement which records physically and perceptually distinguishable changes in quantities of things or different stimuli which evoke distinguishable responses as if they were identical changes in quantities of things or identical stimuli, makes "heterarchies" of values appear to exist. Any "coarse" topology ( ')
F  , and hypothetical activation-inhibition network which generates it, through "refinement" of measurement, is revealed to be "finer" topology ( ' ')
with corresponding actual activation-inhibition network (e.g., Rosen 1976; 1977) . And this is why David Hume warned that any subjects of inquiry must be quantified: bread is never preferred to water, and water is never preferred to bread; concrete changes in quantities of bread are preferred to concrete changes in quantities of water, but other changes in quantities of water are preferred to other changes in quantities of bread, which is of course old news (North 1690; Condillac 1776; Lloyd 1834; Gossen 1854; Jevons 1871; Menger 1871). So, pleasure is "network of neurons is becoming more and more organized," pain is "disruption" of such increasing organization, and emotion is "disruption" of "behavior," either to prolong or preserve "pleasant stimulus" or to avoid or remove "painful stimulus" (Hebb 1949) . (Debreu 1958) . Probability is frequency, or infinite wave-train, or, at least, precisely identical choices must be repeated many times for function to be defined (Gabor 1946) . What contradicts any possibility of function and corresponding function U , in such sense, is that activation-inhibition network is being modified at synapses at level of dendrites after every action and sensation, and inhibitory background, treated as field, is also changing after each and every action and sensation; every situation where choices must be made is unique, and pleasure is "growth" of neural network, which is precisely how learning occurs (Hebb 1949; Pribram 1991 underlying dynamics required to obtain such output; "no shortcut is possible" (Hayek 1952; Rosen 1962; Wolfram 1985; Wolfram 2002) . "Complexity" of system is measured by number of alternative models of system which are not isomorphic, all being required to explain behavior of system or all being different ways in which we may interact with system , so that any complex system has bifurcations in behavior, e.g., people make radical changes in their trajectories (Rosen 1979) . We measure complexity by , so that "simple" systems have "complexity" = , while "complex" systems have "complexity" > 0. Metric lends itself to describing complex systems, which minds are, because it may generate sets not consistently related in real-space but only consistently related in complex-space. 
 is contained in '  , then values are outputs of kind of stepfunction, which is not continuous, with singular points in between ranges of inputs: It is possible to de-compose F into sum of hyper-functions, which is defined by contour integration (from  to  ) of corresponding sum of impulses (Sato 1959; Isao 1992) . Infinite sum (for all labels) of projections of values, which converges in complex-space, generates value hierarchy in real-space:
Then, two analytic functions exist, which are continuous and have derivatives defined for them, and we take (for any one restriction), so that solution 
has neither unique motivation nor unique behavior. It is set of unique stimuli for which Ч   lacks unique responses. If such stimuli are encountered then instead of starting new motivation and its corresponding behavior in addition to present motivation and its corresponding behavior, emotion = + = would be evoked, which is excitation and its corresponding movement that disrupts present behavior by adding n
Emotion causes Ч to stop present motivation and its corresponding behavior, merely allowing next or previous motivation and its corresponding behavior to be evoked (e.g., Hebb 1949 , Pribram 2003 2006) . In not-conscious way, emotions-function e "joins" together many separate parts or "patches" of memory into one preferences-function , which determines conscious decision-making, and would explain why lesions in brain that impair association of emotions and sensations makes remembering sensations and re-constructing past or present sensations in future much more difficult (e.g., Hebb 1949; Pribram & Prigatano 1981) . Emotion evolved, because very quick transition between some one behavior and some other behavior made survival of individual much easier and more likely in many situations. Emotion is necessary for long-term memory and complicated preferences. If, however, people have necessary information to make valid decisions, but make "mistakes" anyway, or if they "panic,"
this also is anticipated by analysis of singular points of . , because choice cannot be made, for lack of reason, and but because reason exists for making one or other choice, however, it not resists environmental gradient in direction corresponding to or environmental gradient in direction corresponding to , so that first perturbation of environment in direction of or in direction of determines
Neuronal model M exists in form of probability-distribution functions described by statistical metric (Menger 1942; Berger & Pribram 1993) . Our brain does not rank probabilities of outcomes, because situations are unique, but rather definite outcomes are manipulated in brain as probability distribution of intervals between excitations, in wave-like way. Overall metric of excitations however is responsible for computations, and when it changes, we would infer changes to compensate. 
if we wish to perceive "nearness" and "distance," in terms of effect upon  or  , then
A C  if we wish to construct probabilistic ratios of measurable variable-quantities, e.g.,
December 31, 2011 arxiv.org/abs/1112.2630and so on, or if our knowledge of relations between elements of metric spaces and (which are sets of elements between which "nearness" and "distance" is actually defined) we may nevertheless determine whether metric spaces ' and are identical or different by measuring frequencies; they are distinguishable if, for any ordered pair ( ,
AB  (which generates ' ) and cumulative distribution function (which generates S ) are distinguishable;
is probability that distance from element to element is , so that , (distance between any element and any identical or not-distinguishable element, such as itself, is 0, which is less than any given positive distance
, distance between any given element and any different or distinguishable element is neither negative, nor 0 (which is distance between any given element and any identical or not-distinguishable element, which is itself);
that distance from to B and distance from B A to are identical (Menger 1942; Menger 1951a; Menger 1951b ion Б ME  is restriction of E to space of behaviors by injection E again, into , composit M (Pribram 1958; Sokolov 1960a; Sokolov 1960b 
in union with every restriction homomorphism
which preserves hierarchical order of values, and where proper time  in effect determines resolution and must be selected to be sufficiently small, and ''
 is contained ' in  . Individuals are obtained, then, by taking cross-sections. Is demand a sheaf, which would allow further analysis, by guaranteeing invariance under wide range of morphisms? That depends on whether sequence of stimuli and responses is "exact" sequence.
Degrees of freedom are different ways which ambiguously maximum satisfaction, but are not locally determined in society: behavior of any one person affects behavior of any other person, changing behavior required for both to obtain maximum satisfaction (Rashevsky 1958) .
If every possible sequence of injections
, then behavior of Ч , which is group of different people, is "smooth," and degrees of freedom are not reduced.
...
Ц Щ Ч  
If exactness of such sequences exists, then { }, ( , ) Э P H E  is P-th sheaf co-homology group of space with coefficients in sheaf E  , which refers to such sequences. That is, "smooth" behavior of many people means they are "society" of people. In the inductive limit, we may consider, demand and supply generated by many people as hyper-function defined on realmanifold comprising of sum of where , Sato 1960) .
In any such "exact" sequence, output (response) of any one person is input (stimulus) of any other person for which other person also has response. If other person has no response for response of previous person to some input, then society breaks-down at that point. There are situations where degrees of freedom are lost, e.g., violence, because no response to violence will create stimulus to next person for which next person has solutions which do not diminish their were re-learned (Brody & Rosvold 1952; Pribram 1954 with, and because everything may be expressed as dynamical equations through equality, there is conservation of energy. Production is only creation of value by transformation of matter from one form to other, more useful form. Production is not creation of matter. If we define behavior * Б and time  as equivalent to some boundary transitions, their role as inputs to production and as stimuli may be investigated.
If
= 0, Q  , economic goods are inputs and outputs, and value of factors of production derives from value of their product, which is labeled as being of "lower order"
"nearer to consumption" (Menger 1871) , then neither domain nor range of production process
are "created." This function is computed by previous analysis, and coefficients are determined by technology .They are elements of complex space, mapped in different ways onto itself.
Topological space is not itself changed by different mappings from one part of it to any other part of it. In fact, only new arrangements (e.g., of neural network), or ideas, can be created.
There are infinitely many such alternatives and these are functions o o  M , physiologically.
Technology is recipe, but it is also capital good, because time must be spent acquiring it, and skills must be learned over to time to make use of it. Part of present income is thus spent to produce future consumption. Part of present income must therefore be "saved," or allocated in this way. There is always some part of present income which is consumed, else people would never consume, which contradicts definition of having preferences. Parts of "influence structure" of this function which comprises of first partial derivatives gives marginal contribution of each factor of production to each product, and thus determines its value. We may abbreviate this by writing ( o * * , Б I ), when we decode stimuli labels arising from behavior of people.
We can "discover" new functions or mapping between different parts of topological space. We can physically create new technology to produce economics goods, but when we produce economics goods, we do not physically create anything new. There are many ways to 
